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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Joseph George Nara appeals the District Court's 
dismissal of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as 
untimely. Nara argues that the one-year statute of 
limitations under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1) should have been 
tolled under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2), because his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea nunc pro tunc was a properly filed 
application for state post-conviction or other collateral 
review that was pending. Alternatively, Nara argues that 
this court should apply equitable tolling principles because 




FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The parties do not dispute the facts of this case. On 
January 28, 1984, Nara shot and killed his wife and 
mother-in-law. After Nara was arrested, he underwent a 
psychiatric evaluation during which he described himself as 
being severely depressed after his wife left him in December 
1983. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Nara 
with two counts of criminal homicide. On June 20, 1984, 
Nara pled guilty in the Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas to two counts of first degree murder and later was 
sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. He did 
not appeal his sentence. 
 
The record shows that Nara's mental condition 
deteriorated while he was in prison. Shortly after he arrived 
at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, he was 
placed in the institution's hospital for "psychiatric reasons." 
App. at 316. Nara was transferred to Farview State Hospital 
after being diagnosed as having "suicidal ideation of severe 
proportions." App. at 319. Although he was returned to 
prison, he was hospitalized again after attempting to 
commit suicide in February 1985 by overdosing on drugs. 
A psychiatrist diagnosed Nara as "severely mentally 
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disabled" and "a clear and present danger to himself." 
Supp. App. at 67. After another lengthy hospital stay for 
approximately 16 months, he was transferred to the State 
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania in 
1986, where he is incarcerated to this day. There is nothing 
in the record of Nara's mental condition after 1986. 
 
On April 21, 1988, Nara filed his first petition for relief 
under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9541 et seq . In the 
accompanying pro se brief, Nara stated, inter alia, that he 
was not mentally competent when he pled guilty and that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assess his 
mental competence at the time of the crimes and when he 
pled guilty. After a hearing at which Nara was represented 
by court-appointed counsel, the trial court denied the 
petition. The trial court's opinion and order, however, 
addressed only the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review in 1989. 
 
On May 15, 1990, Nara filed a second PCRA petition. He 
argued that his plea should be withdrawn because he was 
mentally incompetent when he entered it. The trial court 
appointed new counsel and held a hearing on November 19, 
1990 at which a forensic psychiatrist testified that Nara 
was psychotic and depressed at the time of his guilty plea 
and therefore was "not mentally capable" of entering a plea. 
App. at 474. Based on this testimony, the trial court found 
that Nara's guilty plea was not valid and granted Nara's 
petition. The Commonwealth appealed. The Superior Court 
reversed and reinstated the plea, ruling that the issue of 
Nara's competence had been waived because Nara had 
failed to raise it in his first post-conviction hearing.1 The 
Superior Court stated in a footnote that Nara waived his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note that Nara's pro se brief in support of his first PCRA petition 
asserted that he "was not mentally capable of waiving his constitutional 
rights, and pleading guilty, . . . Guilty plea [sic] is not valid unless 
it is 
voluntary in the constitutional sense." App. at 288. Because the question 
identified in the certificate of appealability granted by this court was 
whether the one-year statute of limitations in S 2244(d)(1) should be 
tolled for any reason, we will limit our review to that issue and will not 
comment on the Pennsylvania court's waiver ruling. 
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right to request withdrawal of his guilty plea by failing to 
file a post-sentence motion to withdraw the plea pursuant 
to Pa. R. Crim. P. 321. That rule provided, in part:"(a) A 
motion challenging the validity of a guilty plea, or the denial 
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea shall be in writing and 
shall be filed with the trial court within ten (10) days after 
imposition of sentence."2 In 1992, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied Nara's petition for allowance to 
appeal. The United States Supreme Court denied Nara's 
petition for certiorari. 
 
On December 19, 1995, Nara filed a third PCRA petition, 
alleging, inter alia, that he was incompetent to enter the 
guilty plea. The trial court appointed attorney Phyllis Jin to 
represent Nara, and held a hearing on April 30, 1996. At 
this hearing, Nara agreed that he had previously litigated 
the issues in his PCRA petition. Nara therefore asked to 
withdraw his PCRA petition in favor of filing a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea nunc pro tunc pursuant to Rule 
321. The court allowed Nara to withdraw the petition and 
issued a briefing schedule for the motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
 
After the submission of briefs, the trial court issued an 
opinion and order on September 30, 1996 denying the 
motion. The court found that Nara had been advised at his 
sentencing in 1984 of his right to move to withdraw the 
plea within 10 days and noted that Nara did not give a 
compelling reason why he waited 12 years to ask to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The Superior Court affirmed on 
July 9, 1997 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 
Nara's petition for allowance to appeal on December 8, 
1997. Nara did not file a motion for reconsideration to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor did he file a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Nara then filed the present Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. The certificate of mailing indicates that the prison 
mailed the petition on December 15, 1998. However, his 
habeas petition is signed and dated December 12, 1998, 




2. The Rule has since been revised and renumbered Pa. R. Crim. P. 720. 
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The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate 
Judge, who recommended that Nara's petition be dismissed 
as untimely and that a certificate of appealability be denied. 
In analyzing the applicability of the one-year statute of 
limitations under S 2244(d)(1) and the tolling provision 
under S 2244(d)(2), the Magistrate Judge determined that 
the latest date on which Nara's application for state post- 
conviction or other collateral review was pending was 
December 8, 1997, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied his petition for allowance of appeal with respect to 
his nunc pro tunc motion. Thus, according to the Magistrate 
Judge, the statute of limitations would have begun on that 
date and would have run until December 7, 1998. 
Therefore, even with the benefit of the mailbox rule which 
would recognize filing of Nara's habeas petition on 
December 12, 1998, his petition was untimely. The District 
Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations, 
dismissed Nara's habeas petition as untimely, and denied 
the certificate of appealability. 
 






A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
On February 15, 2000, a motions panel of this court 
issued a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1) on the following: 
 
       the issues of whether the District Court correctly 
       concluded that Nara's habeas petition was untimely 
       filed under the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 
       S 2244(d)(1), see Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 
       1998), and whether Nara was entitled to any tolling of 
       the limitations period pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. 
       S 2244(d)(2), see Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146 (3d 
       Cir. 1998), or the principles of equitable tolling, see 
       Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999); Miller v. 
       New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616 
       (3d Cir. 1998). In particular, the parties should 
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       address whether Nara's motion to withdraw his guilty 
       plea nunc pro tunc was a `properly filed application for 
       State post-conviction or other collateral review' within 
       the meaning of S 2244(d)(2). If that motion tolled the 
       limitations period, the parties should address whether 
       Nara is also entitled to tolling for the 90-day period 
       following entry of Pennsylvania Supreme Court's order 
       on December 8, 1997, when Nara could have petitioned 
       for certiorari review in the United States Supreme 
       Court. 
 
Nara v. Frank, No. 99-3364, Order Granting Certificate of 
Appealability (Feb. 15, 2000). 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. 
We have plenary review over statute of limitations issues. 
See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
B. The Requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d) 
 
A state prisoner must file his or her habeas corpus 
petition within one year after the completion of the state 
court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d), enacted as part of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214, provides, in relevant part: 
 
       (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
       limitation period shall run from the latest of -- 
 
       (A) the date on which the judgment became final by 
       the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 
       the time for seeking such review; . . . 
 
       (2) The time during which a properly filed application 
       for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 
       respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 
       shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 
       under this subsection. 
 
The inquiry under S 2244(d) encompasses both when the 
judgment of the state court became "final" and when the 
"properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 
collateral review" was "pending." Nara must satisfy the 
provisions of S 2244(d) because he is in custody pursuant 
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to the judgments of Pennsylvania's courts. Nara pled guilty 
on June 20, 1984 and was sentenced on July 13, 1984. 
Nara did not file a direct appeal, so his conviction and 
sentence were "final" on August 13, 1984, when the time 
during which he could have appealed (30 days) lapsed. 
Because we have implied from the statute a one-year grace 
period for those petitioners whose convictions became final 
before the effective date of AEDPA, and AEDPA was effective 
April 24, 1996, Nara had up until, and including, April 23, 
1997 to file a timely petition under S 2244(d)(1). See Burns 
v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998) ("We agree that 
applying S 2244(d)(1) to bar the filing of a habeas petition 
before April 24, 1997, where the prisoner's conviction 
became final before April 24, 1996, would be impermissibly 
retroactive."). However, Nara did not file his federal habeas 
petition until December 12, 1998.3 
 
The principal issue on appeal is whether the one-year 
statute of limitations under S 2244(d)(1) should be tolled for 
any reason. Nara argues that his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea nunc pro tunc tolled the statute of limitations as 
provided by S 2244(d)(2), making his habeas petition timely. 
The Commonwealth disputes whether Nara's nunc pro tunc 
motion can be considered a "properly filed application for 
State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the 
meaning of S 2244(d)(2). The Magistrate Judge determined, 
and the District Court agreed, that it was not necessary to 
resolve this issue because even if the motion was construed 
as such, Nara's habeas petition was still untimely. 
 
It is the Commonwealth's position that a nunc pro tunc 
motion can never be a "properly filed application for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review" because the nunc 
tunc pro characterization is a concession that the movant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Nara has contended that he placed his habeas petition in the prison's 
mailbox on December 12, 1998. The Commonwealth appears to concede 
that the prisoner mailbox rule applies. Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(c), if an 
inmate is confined in an institution, his notice of appeal (or federal 
habeas petition) will be timely if it is deposited in the institution's 
internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. However, the 
inmate is required to make a declaration that sets forth the date of 
deposit and that first-class postage has been prepaid. It appears from 
Nara's habeas petition that he has fulfilled these requirements. 
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failed to request relief in a timely manner. The 
Commonwealth urges us to hold that a nunc pro tunc 
motion in state court does not trigger the tolling provision 
in order to prevent state prisoners from using such motions 
in an attempt to preserve their right to file federal habeas 
petitions and thereby abuse the writ. The Commonwealth 
cites to a footnote in our decision in Swartz . See 204 F.3d 
at 423-24 n.6. We do not read that opinion as holding that 
a nunc pro tunc motion or request is not a"properly filed 
application for State post-conviction or other collateral 
review" under S 2244(d)(2) by virtue of its nunc pro tunc 
character. 
 
Our opinions suggest a much more flexible approach. In 
Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999), we 
stated that S 2244(d)(2) covers "various forms of state 
review," but did not specify the forms of state review that 
qualify for tolling. In Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146 (3d 
Cir. 1998), we considered whether a second or successive 
petition for state post-conviction relief was a"properly filed 
application." We defined "properly filed application" as one 
that is "submitted according to the state's procedural 
requirements, such as the rules governing the time and 
place of filing." Id. at 148. We further rejected "the notion 
that a meritless PCRA petition cannot constitute`a properly 
filed application' under S 2244(d)(2)." Id. at 149. Therefore, 
we treated Lovasz's second PCRA petition as a "properly 
filed application" under S 2244(d)(2). 
 
Indeed, a recent Supreme Court decision supports this 
flexible approach. In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000), 
the Court considered whether the prisoner's pro se motion 
to vacate his judgment of conviction could toll the statute 
of limitations under S 2244(d)(2). The Court stated that "an 
application is `properly filed' when its delivery and 
acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and 
rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for 
example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its 
delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, 
and the requisite filing fee." Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted) 
(footnote omitted). "[T]he question whether an application 
has been `properly filed' is quite separate from the question 
whether the claims contained in the application are 
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meritorious and free of procedural bar." Id.  at 9 (emphasis 
omitted). Thus, the Court upheld the Second Circuit's 
determination that the statute of limitations was tolled 
during the time when the state court was considering the 
prisoner's motion to vacate his conviction, despite the fact 
that the claims in the motion were procedurally barred 
under New York law. See id. at 7-8. 
 
Other courts of appeals have held similarly. See, e.g., 
Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(personal restraint petitions dismissed in state court as 
"repetitive and untimely" were still "properly filed 
applications" within the meaning of S 2244(d)(2)); Emerson 
v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 931 (5th Cir. 2001) (motion to the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals entitled "Suggestion That 
The Court Reconsider On Its Own Motion the denial of the 
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus" was a"properly filed 
application" under S 2244(d)(2)); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 
F.3d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1999) (petition dismissed in 
state court as successive or an abuse of the writ was 
nevertheless a "properly filed application" which tolled the 
statute of limitations under S 2244(d)(2)). 
 
We find these cases to be informative for the case at 
hand. Nara's motion to withdraw a guilty plea nunc pro tunc 
is certainly akin to an application for state post-conviction 
or other collateral review. The PCRA trial court accepted the 
motion, allowed the parties to brief the motion, and made 
a full consideration of the record before denying it. Indeed, 
Nara notes that his motion merely followed what the 
Superior Court suggested when that court disposed of 
Nara's second PCRA petition. See Br. of Appellant at 23-24. 
Lastly, Nara contends that it is not uncommon for 
Pennsylvania courts to accept motions to withdraw guilty 
pleas nunc pro tunc. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 296 
Pa. Super. 315, 442 A.2d 786 (1982). Thus, we hold that 
Nara's motion to withdraw his guilty plea nunc pro tunc was 
a "properly filed application for State post-conviction or 
other collateral review" within the meaning ofS 2244(d)(2). 
 
We turn next to determine how long Nara's motion was 
"pending" under S 2244(d)(2). The District Court agreed 
with the Magistrate Judge that the latest date it was 
"pending" was December 8, 1997, the date on which the 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Nara's petition for 
allowance of appeal. It followed that the last date on which 
Nara could have timely filed his habeas petition was 
December 7, 1998, making his actual filing on December 
12, 1998 untimely. 
 
On appeal, Nara argues that his motion was "pending" at 
least until expiration of the time to seek reconsideration by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (14 days), if not until 
expiration of the time for petitioning the United States 
Supreme Court for certiorari (90 days). In support of this 
contention, Nara cites our decision in Kapral v. United 
States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 1999). In that case, we 
considered 28 U.S.C. S 2255, the habeas provision for 
federal prisoners which requires that a motion challenging 
a sentence be filed within one year of "the date on which 
the judgment of conviction becomes final." The district 
court had ruled that Kapral's motion was untimely because 
it was filed more than one year after the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. We 
reversed, stating that "the judgment of conviction does not 
become `final' until the time for seeking certiorari review 
expires . . . [because] [o]nly when the time for seeking 
certiorari review has expired is it appropriate for a 
defendant to commence a collateral attack on the 
conviction and sentence." Kapral, 166 F.3d at 570-71. We 
stated that any holding to the contrary would invite 
simultaneous proceedings in the Supreme Court and 
district court which "would only impair the orderly 
administration of criminal proceedings." Id.  at 572. We 
noted that the same reasoning applied to the definition of 
"final" judgments under S 2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitation. 
Id. at 574-75. 
 
The issue in Kapral was different than the one before us 
now. In Kapral, we considered when a judgment is "final" 
under S 2244(d)(1), not how long a state application for 
collateral review is "pending" for the purposes of 
S 2244(d)(2). In our subsequent opinion in Swartz, we 
turned to the definition of "pending." See  204 F.3d at 421. 
A trial court denied Swartz's PCRA petition and the 
Superior Court affirmed on October 18, 1996. Swartz did 
not file a timely petition for allowance of appeal to the 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but instead filed a motion for 
permission to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro 
tunc, which was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
on May 2, 1997. Swartz then filed a habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. S 2254 on October 29, 1997. The district court 
dismissed the habeas petition as untimely. 
 
We granted Swartz a certificate of appealability and held 
that the petition was timely. We noted that "pending" is 
defined as: 
 
       [b]egun, but not yet completed; during; before the 
       conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; 
       undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. 
       Awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of action, period 
       of continuance or indeterminancy. Thus, an action or 
       suit is "pending" from its inception until the rendition 
       of final judgment. An action is "pending" after it is 
       commenced by either filing a complaint with the court 
       or by the service of a summons. 
 
Id. at 421 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. p. 1134 
(1990)) (emphases omitted). 
 
We determined in Swartz that "pending" under 
S 2244(d)(2) should be defined to dovetail with our holding 
in Kapral as to when a judgment becomes"final" under 
S 2244(d)(1) (A). Thus, we held that "pending" for the 
purposes of S 2244(d)(2) (when an application for state post- 
conviction or collateral review is "pending")"includes the 
time for seeking discretionary review, whether or not 
discretionary review is sought." Id. We so concluded 
because "[i]f Swartz had attempted to seek federal habeas 
corpus relief while there was still time to seek allowance of 
appeal, the petition would automatically be dismissed for 
failure to exhaust state remedies." Id. at 422. Accordingly, 
we ruled that Swartz's habeas petition was timely because 
it was filed within one year of the expiration of time to seek 
review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id. at 424- 
25. 
 
Nara argues that Swartz supports an interpretation of 
"pending" to include the 14 days during which a prisoner 
could have filed a motion for reconsideration to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Pa. R. App. P. 1123(b), 
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as well as the 90 days allowed to petition for certiorari 
review to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 
U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13. However, in Swartz, we specifically 
noted that "[w]e need not delve into the issue whether 
`pending' includes the time to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court because that 
question is not presented by this appeal." 204 F.3d at 421 
n.5. 
 
The issue has since been presented in Stokes v. District 
Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, 247 F. 3d 539 (3d 
Cir. 2001), a case that was decided after oral argument in 
this case. In Stokes, as in this case, the issue was 
calculation of the period in which the state collateral 
proceeding should have been deemed to be pending. The 
habeas petitioner argued, as does Nara here, that it should 
include the 90 days during which he could have filed a 
certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court, even 
though no such petition had been filed. We rejected the 
argument. We noted that while S 2244(d)(1) explicitly 
provides that the date on which a judgment becomes final 
includes the "expiration of the time for seeking[direct] 
review," S 2244(d)(2) (the tolling provision) contains no such 
language. See id. at 542. We further recognized that 
excluding the 90 days under S 2244(d)(2) "is consistent with 
the requirement that a petitioner exhaust state remedies 
prior to instituting a federal habeas petition" because 
" `[s]uch exhaustion does not include seeking certiorari from 
the state court's denial of post-conviction relief.' " Id. 
(quoting Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 
2001)). 
 
Additionally, we noted that the terms "properly filed 
application" and "pending" in S 2244(d)(2) presuppose that 
the petitioner actually filed a petition for certiorari review as 
to which a decision had not yet been rendered by the 
Supreme Court. See id. at 543 (citing Gutierrez v. Schomig, 
233 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2000)). We held that the 90 days 
should not be considered in calculating the tolling period 
under S 2244(d)(2), in part because Stokes had not filed a 
petition for certiorari review. 
 
All the courts of appeals to have considered this issue 
have held that the 90-day period during which a state 
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prisoner may file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court from the denial of his post-conviction 
appeal does not extend the time in which a state collateral 
attack is pending for purposes of the tolling period under 
S 2244(d). See, e.g., Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691 (6th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1211 (2001); Coates v. Byrd, 
211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 
1129 (2001); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1099 (2000); Rhine v. Boone, 182 
F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084 
(2000). 
 
Stokes forecloses Nara's argument that the 90 days 
during which he could have filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari should be counted for purposes of tolling of the 
one-year statute of limitations. Nara, like Stokes, did not 
file a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court. Therefore, there was no "properly filed application" 
that was "pending" within the meaning of S 2244(d)(2).4 
 
We turn now to whether the 14 days allowed under Pa. 
R. App. P. 1123(b) to seek reconsideration by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should be counted in the 
tolling analysis. Our decision in Lovasz, 134 F.3d 146, 
appears to foreclose this possibility. There, we held that a 
state prisoner's second PCRA petition was pending until the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for 
allowance of appeal. See id. at 149. No consideration was 
given to the 14 days during which the prisoner could seek 
reconsideration. Similarly, we rule that Nara's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea was pending up until the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for 
allowance of appeal. 
 
It is true that some language in our subsequent decision 
in Swartz seems to suggest a different result. There, we 
stated that " `pending' includes the time for seeking 
discretionary review, whether or not discretionary review is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For this reason, Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 1999), does not 
apply to Nara's case. In that case, the petitioner had sought certiorari 
review in the Supreme Court of the denial of his post-conviction petition; 
therefore, the period during which the Supreme Court considered and 
denied the writ of certiorari was counted in the tolling analysis. 
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sought." Swartz, 204 F.3d at 421. But Swartz specifically 
dealt with the time in which a petition for allowance of 
appeal could be brought to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. We recognized that this period must be counted in 
the tolling analysis because a contrary holding would force 
a petitioner to file a habeas petition before exhausting state 
remedies. See id. at 422. The same is not true for the 14- 
day period to file a motion for reconsideration. Once the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denies review the first time, 
the state prisoner may file a habeas petition in federal 
court; s/he obviously need not file a motion for 
reconsideration in order to exhaust the state remedies. 
Therefore, the principles of comity that guided our holding 
in Swartz do not apply in Nara's case. 
 
As we noted in Stokes, S 2244(d)(2) uses the terms 
"properly filed" and "pending." See  247 F.3d at 543. If Nara 
had indeed filed a motion for reconsideration, that motion 
would be "pending" in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
until it was decided by that court. However, because Nara 
did not file a motion to reconsider, nothing was"properly 
filed" or "pending." Therefore, we reject Nara's argument 
that the 14 days during which he could have filed a motion 
to reconsider should have been counted to toll the one-year 
statute of limitations under S 2244(d). Consequently, we 
agree with the District Court that the latest date on which 
Nara could have filed his habeas petition within the 
statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d) was 
December 7, 1998. 
 
C. Equitable Tolling 
 
Nara also argues that we should apply principles of 
equitable tolling to render Nara's petition for habeas corpus 
timely. In Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 
145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998), we explained that "equitable 
tolling is proper only when the principles of equity would 
make the rigid application of a limitation period unfair." Id. 
at 618 (quotation omitted). "[T]his will occur when the 
petitioner has in some extraordinary way . . . been 
prevented from asserting his or her rights." Id. (quotation 
omitted). In such cases, the petitioner "must show that he 
or she exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and 
bringing [the] claims. . . . Mere excusable neglect is not 
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sufficient." Id. at 618-19 (quotation omitted). In Jones v. 
Morton, 195 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999), we added that "a 
statute of limitations should be tolled only in the rare 
situation where equitable tolling is demanded by sound 
legal principles as well as the interests of justice." Id. at 
159 (quotation omitted). Thus in Miller, we vacated the 
dismissal of petitioner's motion for extension of time to file 
habeas petition and remanded for consideration of 
petitioner's claims that he was prevented from filing a 
timely petition because he was in transit between various 
institutions and did not have access to his legal documents. 
See 145 F.3d at 617. 
 
Nara contends that there are extraordinary 
circumstances to justify equitable tolling in his case. First, 
he argues that his mental health problems are 
extraordinary circumstances, and cites to the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Calderon v. U. S. Dist. Court for Cent. 
Dist. of Cal., 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 891 (1999). There the court, sitting en 
banc, upheld the district court's finding thatS 2244(d)(1)'s 
one-year limitations period should be equitably tolled, in 
part because the habeas petitioner's mental incompetency 
prevented him from assisting his attorney in the ongoing 
habeas proceeding. See id. at 541. In fact, the district court 
had explicitly stayed the habeas proceedings in order to 
determine the petitioner's mental capacity to proceed. See 
id. Thus, extraordinary circumstances existed in Calderon 
to justify equitable tolling. 
 
However, we have recognized that mental incompetence 
is not a per se reason to toll a statute of limitations. See 
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 2000). Rather, 
the alleged mental incompetence must somehow have 
affected the petitioner's ability to file a timely habeas 
petition. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (holding that principles 
of equity may apply if the petitioner was prevented from 
asserting his or her rights). In Nara's case, there was no 
evidence in the record that Nara's current mental status 
affected his ability to present his habeas petition. However, 
because Nara originally filed his habeas petition pro se, and 
because he has presented evidence of ongoing, if not 
consecutive, periods of mental incompetency, an evidentiary 
hearing is warranted in order to develop the record. 
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Also troubling is Nara's contention that his attorney in 
the third PCRA proceeding (in which the PCRA petition was 
withdrawn in favor of the motion to withdraw Nara's guilty 
plea) effectively abandoned him and prevented him from 
filing the habeas petition on time. In Nara's application for 
a certificate of appealability, he listed multiple ways in 
which he was allegedly prejudiced by his attorney's failures. 
He claims that his attorney failed to inform him when the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea; that his attorney refused to 
remove herself as appointed counsel after the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court decision, thus preventing him from"moving 
his case forward," App. at 179; that his attorney led him to 
believe that she was going to file the federal habeas petition 
on his behalf; and that his attorney told him that there 
were no time constraints for filing a petition. These are 
serious allegations, if true. 
 
These allegations may constitute extraordinary 
circumstances to justify equitable tolling. As we held in 
Miller and other cases, courts have discretion to apply 
principles of equity when the petitioner has been unfairly 
prevented from asserting his rights in a timely fashion. We 







We reject Nara's contention that his petition was timely 
under the language of S 2244(d). However, we will vacate 
the denial of the habeas petition as untimely and remand 
to the District Court with the direction to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on whether the circumstances warrant 
equitable tolling. We suggest no opinion on the outcome. 
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